ECTHR submissions

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First fax sent to the ECtHR on December 15, 2023

The first fax I sent, on December 15, 2023, to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been heavily redacted but can nevertheless be viewed here: A_1_Binder1_submitted_by_fax_2023-12-15_Redacted.pdf

The only thing the general public can view is that “In compliance with [REDACTED] I am asking the Court to keep this request for interim measures and related documents off public record.”

Based on a phone conversation I had with an employee of the ECtHR, the Court accepted to seal the records pertaining to this case.

However, I also asked the Court that “in the event harm were to come to me and/or my in-laws in China or my family in France, I am asking the Court to release this request for interim measures and all associated document and to make them available to the general public and the press.”

Second fax sent to the ECtHR on December 15, 2023



(1) General Introduction

(2) Dear Honorable Judges of the European Court of Human Rights,

(3) I request the permission to file my application, including the request for interim measures and any subsequent legal proceedings, in the English language. This request is predicated on specific considerations pertinent to the case at hand.

(4) Given the potential international ramifications and the expected media coverage of the issues central to this case, I believe that conducting proceedings in English, which is one of the two official languages of the ECtHR, will facilitate broader understanding and dissemination of information. English, as a widely spoken and internationally recognized language, will enable effective communication with the international community, including the global media, thereby ensuring that the case receives the attention it merits on an international scale.

(5) The nature of the allegations and the potential for a significant scandal underscore the need for transparency and accessibility of information. Utilizing English will aid in meeting these objectives, given its global reach and the role it plays in international discourse.

(6) I assure the Court that my preference for English is not meant to inconvenience the respondent state, France. It is a strategic choice, reflective of the case’s unique international context and the imperative of making its proceedings accessible to a global audience.

(7) On February 16, 2023, I received, via regular mail, the Court’s decision dated November 2, 2022. This notification, which took approximately two and a half months to reach me, informed me of the Court’s approval of my request for anonymity. (I wish to note that I did not receive the email notification that the Court reportedly sent.)

(8) However, it also conveyed the denial of my request for interim measures, which included seeking witness protection from the Court and requesting that France withdraw the criminal charges against me. These charges have been supposedly filed by former Minister of Justice and alleged criminal Nicole Belloubet. At least one other high level elected official, Cédric Villani, lodged a criminal complaint against me. At least one other high level magistrate, François Molins, might have lodged a criminal complaint against me.

(9) The usage of the term ‘alleged criminal’ to qualify Ms Belloubet is not arbitrary and will be substantiated as I detail the egregious practices of certain French state employees. These practices include the doctoring, forging, falsifying, and altering of legal, public, official, court documents – what is known in French as “écriture publique.” Such actions amount to the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique.

(10) In accordance with French law, the failure to report a serious crime such as ‘faux en écriture publique’—the doctoring, forging, falsifying, altering of legal, public, official, court documents—constitutes a criminal offense. Aware of this legal obligation, I proactively alerted Ms. Belloubet, and her staff people and many other high level officials, to these transgressions, going to the extent of launching a non-official website,, to raise public awareness. Despite these efforts, her inaction and apparent indifference to these grave offenses lead me to assert that she may have committed a crime by deliberately ignoring these serious crimes. Hence, I refer to Nicole Belloubet as an ‘alleged criminal’ and former Minister of Justice of France.

(11) I earnestly implore the Court to understand that my characterization of these high-level officials as ‘alleged criminals’ carries no intent of defamation or provocation. My assertions are rooted in a sincere concern for justice and transparency. As the renowned psychologist Daniel Kahneman insightfully observed, human beings are not only susceptible to overlooking the obvious but can also be unaware of this oversight.

(12) This concept of ‘blindness to our blindness’ is pertinent in the context of my allegations. There might be a prevailing perception that France, as a nation, upholds human rights diligently. However, through my submissions, I aim to bring to light certain troubling aspects within the French judicial system. It is my intent to expose these issues, not to disparage, but to ensure that the principles of justice and human rights are genuinely respected and upheld.

(13) I also contend that the French state has actively obstructed my right to individual petition, employing intimidation tactics against both myself and my family members.

(14) Furthermore, as will be elucidated later, France continues to infringe upon my right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed by Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by denying me access to the judicial system.

(15) Since my last request for interim measures, a development of even greater severity has emerged, compelling me to disclose my situation and my identity publicly, despite the European Court of Human Rights having previously approved my request for anonymity.

(16) This is not a decision I take lightly; I deeply value my anonymity and earnestly hope to return to a state of anonymity as soon as circumstances permit. However, the current situation’s gravity leaves me with no other viable option. The safety of my family, in [REDACTED], is my paramount concern. While my family in France has experienced intimidation, recent developments have escalated my concerns, particularly for the safety of [REDACTED].

(17) Additionally, I must stress that, for the sake of our safety, I am currently unable to disclose all details pertinent to this case to the Court. There are substantial grounds for me to believe that I may be subject to blackmail.

(18) In light of these developments, I intend to petition the Court to reconsider its previous decision. I plan to provide a clearer and more comprehensive account of the events that have transpired. To this end, it is essential to first elucidate the systemic issue within the French state apparatus, specifically the habitual occurrence of altering legal, public, official, court documents (“faux en écriture publique”) by state employees, and crimes which are, of course unofficially, condoned by the highest-level officials in France.

(19) The pattern of serious crimes of “faux en écriture publique” unofficially condoned by the highest-level officials in France

(20) I intend to present a mathematical analysis to demonstrate that the pattern of serious crimes of “faux en écriture publique”, a practice unofficially condoned by the highest-level officials in France, is not a mere coincidence or random occurrence.

(21) To establish this, it is essential first to determine an acceptable error rate. While human error is inevitable, and a certain level of error is understandable, we must critically evaluate what constitutes an acceptable frequency of these errors.

(22) Consider, for example, a criminal procedure where a defendant receives approximately 15 communications from the Court. If we assume an error rate of 2% and apply a binomial distribution to calculate the probability, the likelihood of at least one communication containing a significant error that could potentially result in a miscarriage of justice is approximately 26.14%. Is this an acceptable risk? I posit that it is not, and thus, even a 2% error rate is too high.

(23) Reducing the error rate to 1% yields a probability of 13.99% for at least one significant error, and at 0.5%, this probability is 7.243%. Even these lower rates seem unacceptably high when considering the gravity of potential judicial errors.

(24) For argument’s sake, let’s nevertheless adopt a generous " acceptable " error rate of 0.5%.

(25) In my personal quest for justice, I have consistently encountered errors in official, legal, court documents (“écritures publiques”), to the point where I cannot recall receiving a document devoid of errors on the first attempt. These " errors " systematically derail the legal process, effectively barring me from accessing the legal system and thus violating my rights protected under Articles 6 and 13, among others, of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(26) Let us consider a scenario where, within my legal interactions, I am able to accurately identify only 2 documents or decisions that are free from errors, contrasted against 20 documents or decisions that contain errors. This is evaluated under the assumption of a generous " acceptable " error rate of 0.5%. The probability of encountering such a disproportionate number of errors — 20 erroneous versus just 2 correct documents out of 22 in total — is astronomically low, approximately:

(27) 0.000000000000000000000000000000000000000000021820569038391051,

(28) The probability is an astounding 1 in 45,828,319,061,734,946,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. This is not just improbable; it verges on the realms of impossibility. Such a staggeringly small likelihood decisively indicates that the frequency of errors in my case cannot be attributed to chance or normal error rates. It is, by all practical considerations, an impossibility, strongly suggesting a deliberate pattern far beyond any conservative estimates of error frequency.

(29) The number 45,828,319,061,734,946,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, when written out with commas for readability, is forty-five quattuordecillion, eight hundred twenty-eight tredecillion, three hundred nineteen duodecillion, sixty-one undecillion, seven hundred thirty-four decillion, nine hundred forty-six nonillion.

(30) In the initial calculations, I assumed the receipt of merely 2 error-free documents/decisions against 20 documents/decisions containing errors. However, to address the possibility of my own oversight, let’s consider that I might have underestimated the number of error-free documents. Perhaps, in reality, there were 4 or 5 such documents. To further stretch the bounds of generosity in favor of France, let’s hypothesize a scenario where I would have had received an astonishingly high number of 30 error-free documents/decisions, juxtaposed with 20 erroneous ones. Additionally, let’s escalate the already generous acceptable error rate from 0.5% to an even more lenient 2%.

(31) Under these dramatically inflated conditions, the probability of encountering this distribution of errors would be approximately 0.0000000000000000000027764650018126955.

(32) This translates to a likelihood of about 1 in 360,170,216,209,144,020,000.

(33) The name of the number 360,170,216,209,144,020,000, when written out with commas for readability, is three hundred sixty quadrillion, one hundred seventy trillion, two hundred sixteen billion, two hundred nine million, one hundred forty-four thousand, twenty thousand.

(34) Even with these excessively favorable assumptions, the statistical analysis reveals an outcome that borders on the impossible. This leads to an unavoidable conclusion: regardless of how lenient the parameters, the evidence consistently points, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to a deliberate pattern of falsifying, doctoring, forging, and altering public legal official court documents, serious crimes known in France as “faux en écritures publiques.”

(35) This systematic pattern of errors, revealed through statistical analysis, powerfully proves intentional manipulation within the legal system.

(36) This mathematical approach aims to objectively quantify the pattern of so-called errors, offering a stark illustration of the systemic problems within the French judicial system. However, before delving into the specifics of the high-level officials involved, and recognizing that this submission is a request for interim measures, I will revisit this detailed analysis at a later stage. For now, it is crucial to underscore the profoundly damaging effects faced by individuals seeking justice when confronted with such a systematic denial of justice.

(37) In subsequent sections, I will provide precise and concrete examples demonstrating how dates and other key information are doctored, falsified, forged, or altered on official, public, legal, and court documents, effectively sabotaging the legal process. Beyond these manipulations, there are also blatant falsehoods that amount to overt acts of sabotage.

(38) The cumulative impact of these practices is not merely procedural but deeply psychological. For individuals like myself, seeking justice in the face of such systematic obstruction, the experience is akin to psychological torture. This orchestrated induction of a state of learned helplessness clearly constitutes, according to me and as I will detail later, a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment.

(39) In my initial draft for this request for interim measures, my plan was to directly address the continuous violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and then proceed to outline the details of case REF-GFP-001 (my 2018 reference number, ECtHR’s possible reference number: 29837/18), pertaining to my wrongful termination in 2010 for participating in a strike – a legal case that remains unresolved even after 13 years. My initial intention was only then to discuss the McDonald’s case, where I experienced or was at least given the impression of being subjected to blackmail, subsequently. However, upon reflection, I have chosen to prioritize the McDonald’s case in my submission.

(40) I am aware that it may be challenging for the ECtHR judges to approve my request for interim measures based on the ongoing psychological torture aspect, a concern rooted in the potential hesitation to set a legal precedent under Article 3 of the ECHR. Nevertheless, I assert that there is an additional, critical dimension to my case: a serious risk to life or the threat of torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.

(41) Therefore, I will commence with an in-depth exposition of the McDonald’s case, detailing the circumstances of how I was subjected to, or at least unmistakably led to believe I would be, blackmailed. This situation not only persists but, I fear, has likely escalated into an ongoing and potentially active blackmail. Such circumstances amplify the urgency and gravity of my request for interim measures under the ECHR.

(42) The criminal RICO case targeting McDonald’s Corporation and their accomplices, and how I have been, and most likely still currently am, subjected to blackmail. My reference number REF-MCD-002 (ECtHR’s possible reference number 29840/18)

(43) Introduction: As experienced judges, you may initially perceive my claims regarding McDonald’s Corporation’s involvement in mass-marketing frauds and money laundering over decades as exaggerated or unfounded. It’s understandable to be skeptical, especially given the stature and legal resources of McDonald’s. However, I urge you to consider the facts objectively.

(44) Notably, New York Times journalist Constant Méheut has acknowledged understanding the intricacies of the “1 in 4 chances of winning” fraud associated with McDonald’s.

Note for the reader: a demonstration I made to Constant Méheut can be read by clicking on this link.

(45) Furthermore, another crime has been corroborated by a legal professional, a French attorney, who confirmed its fraudulent nature.

(46) It might be tempting to oversimplify the situation by suggesting that McDonald’s attempted to legally scam consumers but inadvertently entangled themselves in criminal practices, leading to a contractual liability of an almost unlimited scale, potent enough to drive them to bankruptcy.

(47) However, McDonald’s cannot justifiably claim that their actions were a result of an error, particularly given the widespread nature of their criminal activities. This assertion is further undermined by my direct communication with McDonald’s headquarters in the United States, where I raised serious concerns about the criminal activities of their subsidiary companies in Europe and, later, even on other continents. Since 2023, I can even demonstrate, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that they committed mass-marketing fraud in the United States.

(48) When I brought these issues to the attention of McDonald’s executives, there was an initial acknowledgment of the gravity of the situation. In 2015, Gloria Santona, then General Counsel of McDonald’s Corporation, expressed serious consideration of the problem in her response, with CEO Steve Easterbrook also being informed. This interaction occurred after repeated attempts to address these issues with McDonald’s France, who has persistently kept committing serious crimes.

(49) The potential involvement of French law enforcement in these matters is suggested by McDonald’s France’s choice of legal representation: Péchenard & Associés, a law firm founded by the parents of the former General Director of the French National Police Frédéric Péchenard. This decision is especially concerning, considering McDonald’s France past indictment for running an illegal lottery and the inherent conflict of interest in hiring such a law firm, which contradicts McDonald’s Corporation’s compliance policy.

(50) My assertion here is not simply to convince you of McDonald’s long-standing engagement in covert fraudulent activities and money laundering, activities that have seemingly evaded widespread notice or have been silenced, as I experienced. The comprehensive crime report I have compiled, encompassing about 100 emails sent to Assistant Legal Attaché Adam Rogalski at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, substantiates my claims with clarity and detail. The final report, currently in an 81-page draft form, will methodically outline the extent of McDonald’s criminal activities over several decades.

(51) For the sake of this argument and until you can review the full report, I ask that you provisionally accept the possibility that McDonald’s operates as a criminal enterprise with deep-seated influence in various governments. This is not an assertion made lightly; it is supported, for instance, by the former CEO of McDonald’s France, who, in his book titled “I sold my soul to McDonald’s,” openly discusses the company’s influence over French politicians and how McDonald’s France succeeded to reduce to silence the French Parliament. An important admission in his book, but which can easily be overlooked, even explains how they corrupt many French elected officials.

(52) I am prepared to share this detailed crime report draft with you, which, while extensive, provides crucial context and evidence for my claims that McDonald’s Corporation is a transnational criminal enterprise at the core of what is de facto one of the most powerful white-collar crime syndicates in the world, if not the most powerful one, currently operating in all impunity.

(53) I refer to McDonald’s Corporation as a “crime syndicate,” not as a hyperbole but as a factual categorization based on the standards set by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC, in its digest of organized crime cases, specifically mentions ’lottery scams’ in the context of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, also known as the Palermo Convention), underlining that the activities of McDonald’s Corporation and their accomplices align with these definitions.

(54) It is therefore profoundly disconcerting that despite my efforts in 2019 to alert French authorities, including high-level officials and magistrates, about McDonald’s categorization as a criminal organization under the UNTOC, their response involved threats and, later, apparent attempts at blackmail. This response is especially troubling given that China, where I currently reside and have been subject to these pressures, ratified the UNTOC on September 23, 2003. France’s actions, as perceived, not only compromise international legal conventions but also infringe upon China’s sovereignty. As a victim of transnational organized crime and now a key witness, analyst, and whistleblower, international law suggests that I should be afforded protection rather than be subjected to threats by the Police.

(55) Furthermore, given that the United States ratified the UNTOC on November 3, 2005, it raises the question: why has France not sought the extradition of American executives implicated in these crimes? The lack of action by French authorities in this regard suggests either a dangerous level of incompetence or a concerning degree of corruption.

(56) The study “Examining the Links between Organized Crime and Corruption,” commissioned by what was then the Directorate General for Justice, Freedom, and Security (now the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers), provides a striking insight into the operational tactics of organized and white-collar criminals. Although it appears to have been removed from the European Commission’s official website, I have retained a copy, accessible here:

(57) On page 14, Figure 1 - “Institutions and Levels Targeted by Organized and White-Collar Criminals” - presents a pattern that resonates alarmingly with the individuals involved in the McDonald’s case.

(58) In the “Public Institution” category, the study identifies “Ministers, high-level judges, and Politicians” as common targets for such criminal enterprises. Additionally, “Police officers, prosecutors, local judges, local government officials (mayors), high-level civil servants” are also mentioned, all of whom have, at various points, been implicated in the McDonald’s case. This pattern aligns disturbingly with McDonald’s operating methods, suggesting that they function in a manner akin to a traditional mafia.

(59) Regarding “political corruption,” the study explicitly states that it is “organized crime’s most powerful tool.” This aligns with the admissions in the book by the former CEO of McDonald’s France, who openly discusses cultivating relationships with influential politicians.

(60) “Police corruption” is also addressed, highlighting that organized crime groups often corrupt law enforcement to gain information on investigations or protection for their ongoing illegal activities. The hiring of a law firm with direct ties to the former General Director of the French National Police by McDonald’s is, in this context, profoundly troubling. This act, along with the former CEO’s own admissions, paints a picture of a corporation deeply entwined with elements of systemic corruption and organized crime.

(61) Again, for the purposes of this discussion, I request that you consider the likelihood of my allegations being truthful, given the substantiated evidence I can provide.

(62) The issue of blackmail is of profound seriousness, especially when it involves a government entity like France trying to cover up such a major transnational criminal case. The significant economic and employment implications of a potential McDonald’s France bankruptcy are reasons explicitly cited to me. However, I contest this justification and even consider it could amount to treason, a point I will elaborate on later.

(63) Timeline of Key Events Culminating in Blackmail (Including an Incomplete List of Some “Faux en Écriture Publique” Incidents — Doctoring/Altering/Falsifying/Forging of Legal/Public/Official/Court Documents/Decisions):

(64) In the fall of 2011, I unwittingly became a victim of actions that, as I later discovered, constitute federal crimes under American laws. Although I was unaware of this at the time, the gravity of these offenses has since become clear to me. While I recognize that the European Court of Human Rights is not an appellate court, it is necessary for me to succinctly outline the events that transpired to convey the seriousness of the situation. However, my intention here is not to delve into detailed demonstrations of the numerous frauds committed by McDonald’s Corporation and their global accomplices, including McDonald’s France. Should the Court wish to verify my claims, I am prepared to provide my current crime report, draft number 12, which spans 81 pages. This report has already been submitted to the FBI and the SEC and will be published upon finalization.

(65) I possess substantial evidence that can establish many of McDonald’s mass-marketing frauds beyond a shadow of a doubt and demonstrate instances of money laundering beyond a reasonable doubt. Under a system where the rule of law is fully upheld, such revelations would likely lead to the bankruptcy of McDonald’s Corporation. However, these detailed expositions are not the primary focus of this request for interim measures. It is crucial for the Court to understand the extent of the exceptionally serious crimes committed by McDonald’s Corporation, to appreciate the egregiousness of the French authorities’ alleged past actions of subjecting me to blackmail, illegal surveillance, and spying, which subsequently extended to my wife.

(66) Moreover, these actions have potentially led to a flagrant violation of China’s sovereignty, where we currently reside, posing severe risks to our freedom. For instance, we could unknowingly be under an exit ban, a situation we might only discover upon attempting to leave China. The current state of affairs effectively places us within an ‘arena’ in China.

(67) Below is a brief yet incomplete timeline of this case. I aim to highlight several incidents of “faux en écriture publique” committed by France, indicating a practice seemingly endorsed by high-level French officials.

(68) After falling victim to one of the numerous fraudulent schemes orchestrated by McDonald’s, I sought legal aid to file a criminal complaint against them. My initial application was unjustly denied, an act constituting “faux en écriture publique” (the doctoring/altering/falsifying/forging of legal/public/official/court documents/decisions). Undeterred, I appealed this decision. The Appeal Court of Versailles acknowledged that my request was indeed valid and should not have been dismissed. However, in a shocking turn of events, they concocted a false justification for the initial denial, committing yet another instance of “faux en écriture publique.” Persisting, I submitted a new application, which was finally approved following these two egregious occurrences of legal falsification which constitute a serious crime under French law.

(69) During this tumultuous period, my wife was diagnosed with cancer, adding personal distress to my ongoing financial strain. While the wrongful termination case had yet to be adjudicated, meanwhile an in attempt to address the McDonald’s case, I borrowed 1,000 euros to enlist a private lawyer, Erkia Nasry, for drafting a demand letter to McDonald’s France. Despite accepting the fee, Ms. Nasry failed to provide a receipt, write the letter, or honor the agreement. When I requested a refund due to her inaction and the urgent nature of my wife’s health condition, she responded with blackmail and threats rather than compliance.

(70) Erkia Nasry was fully aware of the urgency behind my need for legal services due to my wife’s cancer diagnosis. I had openly communicated the critical situation we were facing, including the financial distress and the emotional turmoil caused by the conflicting medical opinions we were grappling with. Given these circumstances, I had expected a prompt response from her, especially considering her purported expertise in consumer law protection.

(71) However, despite accepting the payment, Ms. Nasry neither issued a receipt nor fulfilled her professional obligation to draft the demand letter. The delay was particularly stressful, compounded by the fact that she didn’t communicate any inability to address the case promptly, which would have been in line with the ethical standards expected of French lawyers.

(72) Ultimately, seeing no progress and receiving no updates from her, I informed Ms. Nasry that her services were no longer required. While I admit that my manner of conveying this decision might have been abrupt, it was a legal right exercised due to her failure to deliver the agreed-upon service. In retrospect, I regret if my approach seemed harsh, but under the strain of my wife’s health crisis and Ms. Nasry’s professional negligence, my response was one of a client desperately seeking redress. Ms. Nasry’s subsequent reaction to this termination was wholly unprofessional; she resorted to blackmail and threats, adamantly refusing to return the fee, thereby violating the deontological code of conduct expected of her profession.

(73) In an intriguing twist, Ms. Nasry was the very first lawyer I consulted about the McDonald’s case back in 2011, at Jérôme Franck’s law firm, then the sole Parisian firm listed for consumer protection and closely linked to the prominent consumer association UFC-Que Choisir. Ms. Nasry informed me that she was succeeding Jérôme Franck, who was retiring. However, I later discovered that Jérôme Franck had actually sold his firm, which primarily serviced UFC-Que Choisir, to Ms. Nasry and subsequently assumed the second highest-ranking position within the association. This revelation is particularly troubling, considering the association’s financial support from the French government and raises potential legal concerns under French criminal law. This background is pertinent as it helps to understand why UFC-Que Choisir has remained inactive regarding the widespread fraud involving McDonald’s. While this may seem tangential to my main request, it provides essential context for understanding the broader implications of this case.

(74) I would like to recount a notable aspect of my initial encounter with Erkia Nasry in Paris, shortly after falling victim to McDonald’s fraudulent practices. During our first meeting, Nasry quickly grasped the significance of the case. She candidly remarked, in a tone that still resonates with me, that McDonald’s would likely deploy ‘20 lawyers’ in response, clearly recognizing the legal ramifications and understanding that McDonald’s lacked adequate legal protection for their actions.

(75) Nasry was the one who suggested that I could initially approach McDonald’s directly, proposing that I write to them myself to claim the prizes I would have rightfully won if the game had not been manipulated. Her exact words in French were along the lines of, ‘[you never know, maybe they will simply give it to you].’ While I vividly remember the essence of her suggestion, I admit the exact phrasing might not be precise. Her recommendation reflected a sense of possibility that McDonald’s might comply without legal compulsion, acknowledging the potential gravity of their legal exposure. I have further details to share on this matter, but for now, I will proceed with the timeline.

(76) After being defrauded by attorney Erkia Nasry, I finally received a positive response from the legal aid office of the Versailles Court, despite initially facing two instances of “faux en écriture publique,” including one by the Appeal Court. However, the legal aid attorney assigned to my case failed to take any action, despite being fully aware of the urgency due to my wife’s serious health condition, a lymphoma among other conditions.

(77) In accordance with official procedures, I appealed to the Procureur Général of the Appeal Court. Regrettably, the only response I encountered was a threat from Avocat Général Jacques Cholet. The sole official communication I recall receiving was a notification that Avocat Général Cholet had been appointed to investigate my case. However, I strongly suspect that the outcome of this investigation will be another count of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique.” (The falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of a court/legal/public/official document)

(78) I have concrete evidence to support this: I legally recorded a phone conversation with the designated legal aid attorney, a practice permissible under French law and admissible in criminal court. This recording conclusively demonstrates that the attorney lied about the reasons for the delay in my case. His explanation, as relayed to the head of the bar association and subsequently communicated to me, directly contradicts what he stated in our phone conversation. When I later inquired with the Office of the Procureur General of the Versailles Appeal Court for an update on my complaint, I was informed that no independent investigation had been conducted, apart from inquiries with the bar association. Given that both the bar association and potentially the Office of the Procureur General had been made aware of the attorney’s deceit, any resulting decision or lack thereof from the Procureur General’s office suggests willful ignorance or criminal negligence, likely amounting to yet another instance of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique.” (The falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of a court/legal/public/official document)

(79) Furthermore, the assigned attorney, Hervé Kerourédan, not only lied but also blackmailed me. He coerced me into signing a contract under which he would receive financial compensation, a blatantly illegal and criminal act of blackmail, prohibited under French law. The psychological distress and urgent need for resolution due to my wife’s cancer left me feeling cornered with no option but to yield to his demands. I complied and returned the signed contracts to him, with his assurance of providing me with copies, which he never did. This series of events reflects not just a failure of legal duty but an exploitation of my vulnerable situation.

(80) In 2015, I made efforts to bring the alleged criminal activities of McDonald’s to the attention of U.S. authorities, suspecting violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Initially, I contacted the FBI Field Office in Washington D.C. However, there was a procedural error in their response; instead of directing me to the nearest FBI Field Office in Beijing, China (country where I was residing), they incorrectly referred me to the Chicago Field Office, where McDonald’s Corporation is headquartered. This misdirection was a critical oversight, considering the geographical relevance to my situation.

(81) Upon contacting the Chicago Field Office, I encountered further misunderstandings. The intake operator at the FBI there failed to grasp the significance of my allegations related to the FCPA, despite my explicit mention of corruption of foreign officials. This misunderstanding was significant, given the FBI’s role in investigating FCPA violations. Regarding my complaint filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), there may have been a lack of due diligence on their part.

(82) As years passed, no discernible action was taken. I also reported McDonald’s alleged crimes to the French public prosecutor. However, the response I received was a categorical denial of any infractions by McDonald’s. French law professor Yves Strickler later clarified to me that these decisions by the public prosecutor, known as “avis de classement” (case closed/case dismissed/no further action notice), are classified as “écriture publique” (court/legal/public/official document) Professor Strickler raised the possibility of error on the prosecutor’s part, but the pattern of repeated " errors " strongly suggests, at the very least, deliberate oversight. The improbability of so many mistakes occurring innocently points to a more calculated series of “faux en écriture publique.” (The falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of a court/legal/public/official document)

(83) In the fall of 2015, I took the initiative to directly contact the executives of McDonald’s Corporation. This action followed my earlier attempt in 2012 to urge the executives of McDonald’s France to notify McDonald’s Corporation to issue a profit warning and report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) about the extensive frauds they had committed, which had already put them on the brink of bankruptcy. Whether or not McDonald’s France conveyed this information to McDonald’s Corporation remains to be determined through a criminal investigation. However, what I can irrefutably confirm is that I personally informed McDonald’s Corporation and their top executives in the fall of 2015. Their acknowledgment of the seriousness of the issue was confirmed in a written response from Gloria Santona, then General Counsel, which was also sent to then-CEO Steve Easterbrook. Prior to this written confirmation, I had a brief telephonic conversation with Ms. Santona.

(84) During this period, I also alerted McDonald’s Corporation to ongoing fraudulent activities in France, highlighting the opportunity they had to intervene and stop these illegal actions. Despite this, McDonald’s Corporation chose not to act, effectively burying their heads in the sand. This inaction eliminates any possibility of plausible deniability on their part. Their awareness of, and failure to address, the fraudulent activities of their European subsidiaries go beyond mere wishful blindness or criminal negligence; it constitutes tacit approval of these activities. This is a pivotal point from a legal standpoint, as the obviousness of the fraud directly implicates McDonald’s Corporation in the grave crime of money laundering.

(85) One might naturally question why, in the face of obvious ongoing mass-marketing frauds that inherently involve money laundering, the executives at McDonald’s Corporation didn’t immediately cease such criminal activities. The answer, I believe, lies in the scale and significance of these marketing operations. McDonald’s invests hundreds of millions of euros/dollars annually in these campaigns, which are not only pivotal to their yearly marketing strategy but also hold substantial global importance. Abruptly halting a sweepstakes soon after its launch would inevitably attract media scrutiny, leading to uncomfortable questions and potentially drawing the attention of law enforcement authorities. Such a situation would significantly complicate any attempts at a cover-up.

(86) In 2015, after receiving a written acknowledgment from McDonald’s Corporation’s General Counsel Gloria Santona that they were taking my inquiry seriously, I reached out to several (5 if I recall correctly) American newspapers, including The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, both of which immediately answered to know more. Stephanie Strom of The New York Times even managed to secure an interview with then-CEO Steve Easterbrook shortly thereafter. However, her published articles did not reference my allegations of fraud. Whether she broached this topic with Mr. Easterbrook remains unknown. The predicament for a CEO facing accusations of fraud, especially with the possible scrutiny of a publication as influential as The New York Times, is substantial. In such a scenario, the decision to not draw further attention to the issue by cancelling an ongoing sweepstakes – effectively a mass-marketing fraud – would seem a strategic, albeit ethically questionable, choice.

(87) In the fall of 2016, new instances of fraud occurred in France, which I can also demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt (i.e. with a 100% certainty rate based on a relatively simple mathematical demonstration). Despite my repeated notifications to McDonald’s Corporation and their executives, they again chose to ignore these criminal activities. The same pattern continued into 2017, with the notable change that Gloria Santona left McDonald’s Corporation, where she had worked for over three decades, to join another company. I speculate that the burden of being part of this criminal enterprise became too much for her, leading to her departure.

(88) In 2016, as the statute of limitations for civil litigation approached, I found myself unable to pursue a criminal complaint against McDonald’s due to the pervasive crimes of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of court/legal/public/official documents/decisions) by French officials. Consequently, my only remaining avenue was civil litigation. This required me to incur further debt to hire a private attorney, as the previously assigned legal aid attorney had failed to fulfill his duties, compounding the obstacles I faced in seeking justice.

(89) McDonald’s France was initially represented by Péchenard & Associés, a law firm with notably close ties to the French Police. This firm was founded by the parents of Frédéric Péchenard, who, at the time I became a victim of the crimes committed by McDonald’s, was the General Director of the French National Police and thus in a position to oversee investigations into such financial crimes. Éric Andrieu, a partner at Péchenard & Associés and the attorney representing McDonald’s, is reportedly the best friend, since childhood, of Frédéric Péchenard. The involvement of a law firm so intimately connected to the French Police, particularly given McDonald’s history of legal challenges (over 20 years ago in France, they were indicted for running an illegal lottery), contravenes the compliance policies of McDonald’s Corporation. Despite bringing this conflict of interest to the attention of McDonald’s Corporation executives, they chose to overlook it.

(90) Moreover, the relationship between Frédéric Péchenard and François Molins, the then public prosecutor of the Paris Court, is relevant, particularly in light of the “faux en écriture publique” issues that arose in criminal complaints, including one directly overseen by Mr. Molins.

(91) The legal summons I issued was initially directed at McDonald’s France and one of their accomplices. However, due to my constrained financial situation and inability to secure additional funds, my ability to pursue justice was significantly hampered. This limitation meant that the summons could not encompass all involved entities, like the corrupted official who illegally approved the fraudulent sweepstakes, resulting in a breach of my rights as guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(92) Subsequently, McDonald’s France shifted their legal representation to the international Big Law law firm Allen & Overy. Notably, I had observed connections to my websites from the Allen & Overy network in London one to two years earlier, indicating most likely that McDonald’s Corporation was directly overseeing the case. This observation is pertinent as it raises Allen & Overy’s involvement in aiding and abetting McDonald’s Corporation and their accomplices in money laundering activities, a matter that warrants thorough investigation by the authorities.

(93) Tragically, my financial constraints severely impaired my ability to continue the legal battle against McDonald’s. This dire situation led to a blatant denial of my basic legal rights. I was categorically denied access to the critical evidence that McDonald’s presented in their defense, leaving me in the dark about key aspects of their case. Moreover, I was utterly deprived of the opportunity to challenge their arguments, which I firmly believe are not only fundamentally flawed but deliberately deceptive. Arguments riddled with what can be more accurately described as sophisms rather than mere logical or mathematical errors.

(94) This complete lack of access effectively nullified my right to a fair adversarial process, as I was unable to respond or counter their assertions in any meaningful way. The absence of this essential element of legal fairness — the right to see and contest the evidence and arguments brought against me — constitutes a gross violation of the principles of justice. The adversarial procedure, a cornerstone of equitable legal proceedings, was unequivocally not respected, marking a profound failure in the judicial process I was subjected to.

(95) Furthermore, I strongly suspect the introduction of at least two pieces of false evidence during the civil litigation. While I cannot confirm this with absolute certainty, the circumstances suggest serious irregularities. Prior to their response, I had informed McDonald’s legal representatives at Allen & Overy of my financial inability to continue the case, potentially giving them the leeway to introduce questionable evidence, knowing I would be unable to scrutinize it.

(96) At this juncture, it’s natural to question why a renowned Big Law firm like Allen & Overy would risk their reputation and their attorneys’ careers by potentially introducing false evidence. Why would they proceed to trial, knowing the seriousness of the crimes McDonald’s allegedly committed, instead of opting for a settlement before the trial even began?

(97) While my theory is speculative, it is grounded in informed reasoning. I surmise that the lawyers at both Péchenard & Associés and Allen & Overy may have faced inadequate financial coverage in terms of insurance for legal malpractice. At some point in time, I believed my rightful compensation claim from McDonald’s, for the loss of chance of winning hadn’t McDonald’s rigged the sweepstakes, should be around 2.4 million euros. However, the private attorney I later hired corrected this estimate to over 16 million euros. Given that Parisian attorneys are typically insured up to only 3 million euros through the Paris Bar Association, such a significant financial discrepancy could have led to desperate measures. If I were in the position of McDonald’s executives and was advised by these law firms to anticipate a maximum liability of 2.4 million euros, only to later face a potential claim of over 16 million euros due to legal malpractice, I would expect the attorneys to be personally accountable for the difference. This scenario could plausibly explain the seemingly reckless legal strategies employed by these firms.

(98) Furthermore, there is an additional grave concern related to money laundering. In the crime report I have prepared for the FBI, the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), and FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - U.S. Treasury), which will soon be published online, I address the issue of asset forfeiture of McDonald’s attorneys under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The report includes a significant legal precedent that I quote from a document I found on the website of the American Bar Association: ‘[…] The Court then provided a concrete example of this concept: “[a] robbery suspect . . . has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is apprehended,” and no lawyer has the right to accept stolen property or ransom money in payment of a fee—“the privilege to practice law is not a license to steal.” Id. […]’ (I emphasize)

(99) This legal principle underscores the seriousness of the situation and the potential implications for the attorneys involved, particularly in the context of their handling of the McDonald’s case. In 2022, recognizing the gravity of the situation, I filed a second complaint with the Office of the Whistleblower of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This complaint specifically highlighted several key figures and entities as potential subjects of interest. Notably, I included Frédéric Péchenard, the former General Director of the French National Police, the law firm Péchenard & Associés founded by his parents, and the Big Law law firm Allen & Overy. The complaint also named the respective attorneys from these firms who represented McDonald’s, along with other pertinent individuals.

(100) My assertion is that these law firms, through their representation, have knowingly aided and abetted McDonald’s in committing acts of money laundering. Given the mounting evidence suggesting McDonald’s has operated as a criminal enterprise under the RICO Act, I contend that these legal entities should have exercised due diligence before agreeing to represent them. Their involvement implicates them in the broader scheme of criminal activities perpetrated by McDonald’s, warranting thorough investigation and scrutiny.

(101) I want to highlight several critical points that underscore the gravity of the situation. During the legal proceedings against McDonald’s, there was a blatant disregard for the adversarial process. I was unjustly denied access to the evidence McDonald’s presented and the opportunity to respond to their deliberately misleading argumentation, possibly based on false evidence. This fundamental breach resulted in my losing the case, which is astonishing given that I can conclusively prove the frauds committed by McDonald’s in 2011 and in subsequent years.

(102) It’s essential to state unequivocally that the French judges handling this case displayed not only dangerous incompetence but also evident corruption. They falsely claimed in their judgment that the adversarial process had been upheld, which is an outright fabrication. It’s impossible for the adversarial process to be respected if I was never allowed to see McDonald’s evidence or respond to their misleading argumentation, possibly based on false evidence. Their claim is an egregious lie, undermining the very foundations of justice.

(103) This case was nothing short of a sham trial, a mockery of judicial integrity. The judges must have been influenced in some way, as they were fully aware of my financial inability to continue the case yet proceeded as if this critical fact was irrelevant.

(104) A crucial element for future criminal investigations to determine is the potential connection between Judge Perrine Robert and the then Procureur Général of the Appeal Court, Marc Robert. If such a relationship exists, it would further implicate the Appeal Court in neglecting its duties, especially given their awareness of the lies perpetuated by the legal aid attorney assigned to my case. My speculation, based on limited evidence, is that Marc Robert might be related to Perrine Robert, potentially as her father-in-law. While this is speculative (I guess about 10% of chance) and based on scant information, it’s a lead that cannot be ignored given the dramatic nature of this case. Every potential coincidence and connection must be thoroughly examined to uncover the truth behind this egregious miscarriage of justice.

(105) In the aftermath of what can only be described as a judicial farce and sham trial, I was left disillusioned with the entire legal aid system, which I had already come to see as thoroughly ineffective. Despite this disillusionment, I applied for legal aid for the appeal process. Looking back, I now realize the importance of this step, as it further exposed the systemic issues within the judicial system. Predictably, my application for legal aid in the appeal was denied due to, yet again, another instance of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” – the deliberate falsification, doctoring, forging, and altering of an official court document. In this instance, a date within the judicial system was manipulated to falsely indicate that my application was filed too late, which was patently untrue, constituting another grave offense.

(106) While this pattern of serious crimes of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of court/legal/public/official documents/decisions) is not exclusive to my case against McDonald’s Corporation, it becomes particularly egregious in this context. The severity of McDonald’s alleged crimes – including substantial frauds targeting a wide demographic, including children, and transnational money laundering with long-term detrimental economic impacts – renders such ‘errors’ absolutely indefensible. These are not mere oversights but a consistent pattern of serious crimes seemingly sanctioned, albeit unofficially, by the highest level of French officials and magistrates. This raises significant concerns about the ability of elected officials to govern justly and uphold the law. My rights, as protected under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), are non-negotiable and must be upheld, irrespective of any political considerations or implications.

(107) When I received the decision in 2018, denying my legal aid for the appeal on the grounds of this serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of a court/legal/public/official document/decision) and coinciding with the European Court of Human Rights’ rejection of the five cases I had submitted, I was plunged into deep despair. The ongoing psychological torment and the sense of injustice were overwhelming. The continued denial of justice, exacerbated by the apparent complicity of the judicial system in these malpractices, led me to the darkest depths of hopelessness.

(108) Between 2018 and early 2019, I tirelessly reached out to various high-ranking French officials and magistrates, including figures as prominent as President Macron, to shed light on the alarming instances of the serious crimes of ‘faux en écriture publique’ (the falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of court/legal/public/official documents/decisions) within the French judicial system. My communications were accompanied by indisputable evidence, such as mismatched dates on official documents, unequivocally demonstrating the manipulation and doctoring occurring at certain levels of the judiciary. The volume of examples I possess is substantial, but I will refrain from delving into each case due to the urgency of this current request.

(109) In the spring and summer of 2019, my focus turned to Cédric Villani, a distinguished member of the French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale) and a Fields Medal laureate, an honor equivalent to the Nobel Prize in mathematics. Given the pervasive nature of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of court/legal/public/official documents/decisions) I had documented, I believed it was within his parliamentary responsibilities to oversee the government’s actions. I specifically highlighted one aspect of McDonald’s France’s alleged frauds from 2011: the evil mass-marketing scheme promising a 1 in 4 chance of instant wins. (Reminder: McDonald’s lied and defrauded tens of millions of consumers, the real probability of winning was in fact 1 in 8)

(110) August 2019: [SELF-CENSORED: In compliance with potential obligations under the [REDACTED] and other applicable legal frameworks, I am compelled to omit a pivotal detail that significantly pertains to this request for interim measures. This decision is made out of caution to avoid any unintentional violations of legal statutes, particularly those concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]

(111) Villani’s office initially responded positively, expressing a willingness to assist. However, it became apparent that his attention was divided, as he was gearing up for his mayoral campaign in Paris. This political ambition seemingly overshadowed his obligations as a parliamentarian. In an effort to raise public awareness about the ongoing impunity with which McDonald’s operated, I registered the domain names and, similar to my approach with other officials.

(112) The launch of the website (archived at was met with serious threats from Villani’s Director of Communication, Philippe Mouricou. The pressure I faced from Mouricou was intense, with him even hinting at legal actions against me, despite my consistent clarification of the website’s unofficial status. This response only served to underscore the challenges I faced in my quest to bring these judicial malpractices to light.

(113) Philippe Mouricou’s accusation that I was employing tactics similar to McDonald’s, by allegedly pressuring Cédric Villani, raised a significant concern for me. It hinted at the possibility that McDonald’s might have exerted influence over a French elected official. This suspicion gains further credence when considering the revelations in the book “I Sold My Soul to McDonald’s” (a very relevant and revealing book title in reference to the expression selling one’s soul to the devil) by Jean-Pierre Petit, former CEO of McDonald’s France. In this book, Petit boasts about McDonald’s influence over French politicians and their ability to silence the French Assemblée Nationale (the lower house of the bicameral French Parliament). Such admissions are alarming and suggest deep-seated corruption.

(114) Intriguingly, Petit’s book also seems to inadvertently admit violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a point I’ve elaborated on in my crime report to be submitted to the FBI.

(115) Following the threats from Villani’s director of communication and his erroneous invocation of the separation of powers as a justification for Villani’s inaction on these serious crimes, I reached out to the French anticorruption association Anticor. I inquired about the legal obligations of French elected officials to report crimes of which they are made aware. On September 27, 2019, Anticor’s response was clear and unequivocal: Yes, French elected officials do indeed have a legal duty to report such crimes. Additionally, Anticor voluntarily pointed out another pertinent law concerning the failure to report serious crimes, which in itself constitutes a criminal offense. This likely refers to the “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/doctoring/forging/altering of court/legal/public/official documents/decisions) instances I had highlighted in my communications to French officials since 2018, many of which were CC’d to Anticor’s experts. Their responses and the evidence I presented likely led them to this conclusion, exposing the widespread and systematic nature of these document alterations.

(116) On September 27, 2019, I took the decisive step of forwarding Anticor’s clarifying response directly to Mr. Cédric Villani, a member of the French Parliament, with the following message which I translate directly into English:

“To the Attention of Mr. Cédric Villani, Deputy of Essonne (5th constituency)

Dear Mr. Villani,

I have been subjected to repeated pressures and thinly veiled threats from your Director of Communication, Mr. Philippe Mouricou.

Following these incidents, I have decided to temporarily self-censor while drafting and submitting a request for interim measures to the European Court of Human Rights (Article 39 of the Court’s rules).

In one of our exchanges, Mr. Mouricou claimed ignorance regarding whether Article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPP) applies to elected officials. I asked the question to Anticor. Their response is provided below.


Vincent Le Corre

[And I forwarded to Mr. Villani the email from the French anticorruption association Anticor]”

(117) I also made Anticor’s response publicly available online.

(118) Interestingly, according to a Wall Street Journal article, the investigation into Steve Easterbrook, former CEO of McDonald’s Corporation, commenced approximately a week after I forwarded Anticor’s reply to Villani and published it online. This timing suggests a potential correlation between these events, underscoring the impact and reach of my efforts to bring these issues to light.

(119) Prior to these developments, I had publicly accused Steve Easterbrook, the then-CEO of McDonald’s Corporation, of being a white-collar criminal. I had repeatedly alerted McDonald’s executives to their ongoing criminal activities, but to no avail. The comprehensive crime report I am preparing to publish online substantiates these accusations with compelling evidence. I can provide the Court with an 81-page draft of this report for review.

(120) However, during this tumultuous period, I faced another setback when an article in “Brain Magazine” publicly shamed me. This unwarranted scrutiny added to the years of distress and psychological torture I had endured from the French authorities, leaving me devastated. The timing and nature of this article lead me to suspect that it may have been a strategic move to silence my appeal for assistance on my website, particularly my request to Cédric Villani. Given Villani’s expertise in mathematics, as a Fields Medal laureate, he could have validated, mathematically and therefore beyond a shadow of a doubt with a 100% certainty rate, my allegations of mass-marketing frauds committed by McDonald’s.

(121) Interestingly, a similar situation had occurred a few years earlier with L’Express, a well-known French magazine, which had planned to publish an article about my civil litigation against McDonald’s France and the allegations of fraud. The story was scheduled for publication, but it was abruptly halted by the magazine’s higher-ups, possibly, I speculate, due to pressure from McDonald’s. Such an article during the litigation process could have shone a spotlight on the dysfunctionalities of the French judicial system, potentially preventing the judges from falsely claiming that an adversarial process had been followed.

(122) In early November 2019, Steve Easterbrook, whom I had long accused of white-collar criminality, was abruptly dismissed from McDonald’s Corporation. The official reason given for his termination seemed implausible to me at the time and still seems implausible to me today. I might even have kept a piece of evidence from that time, a screenshot from a financial analyst specializing in the restaurant industry, suggesting that McDonald’s PR team may have orchestrated this narrative. Access to some of my evidence is currently limited due to severe censorship by Big Tech companies, many of which have financial ties to McDonald’s and its affiliates. As a result, most of my accounts have been suspended for speaking the truth.

(123) September 2019 to January 2020: multiple events => [SELF-CENSORED: In compliance with potential obligations under the [REDACTED] and other applicable legal frameworks, I am compelled to omit a pivotal detail that significantly pertains to this request for interim measures. This decision is made out of caution to avoid any unintentional violations of legal statutes, particularly those concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]

(124) In September 2021, I discovered a crucial piece of information that I had been completely unaware of: around the same time as Steve Easterbrook’s dismissal from McDonald’s Corporation in early November 2019, my brother was being interrogated by the French Police. This revelation was entirely new to me, and I assert this truth under oath and penalty of perjury. Until that moment in September 2021, I had absolutely no knowledge of this interrogation. The exact date of the interrogation remains unclear to me, but I understand it occurred at the beginning of November 2019. This incident had a profound and intimidating effect on my family in France, who felt threatened on more than one occasion. My brother was reportedly told by the police that it was fortunate he complied with their summons, as failure to do so would have led to his arrest at his home. This is based on my understanding of the events as explained to me later.

(125) Regarding Mr. Easterbrook’s termination, I remain skeptical of the official reason cited for his dismissal – a consensual relationship. My deep knowledge of the timeline of McDonald’s criminal activities and their nature leads me to question this explanation. While it is the official reason provided, I believe it served as a convenient cover for more serious issues. It is a verifiable fact, supported by mathematical evidence, that McDonald’s has engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities, as defined under 18 U.S. Code § 1961 (5), for years if not decades. The crimes of deliberately committing significant frauds, targeting various demographics including children, and engaging in money laundering, are undeniably more severe than the implications of a consensual relationship. The public narrative provided by McDonald’s simply couldn’t acknowledge their long-standing fraudulent and money laundering operations, a truth that lies parallel to the official story released.

(126) In January 2020, I reached out to Cedric Villani via email, a follow-up to my earlier notification about my intention to seek interim measures from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This time, I informed him of my impending formal notice, invoking Article 431-1 of the French Criminal Code, which mandates the reporting of serious crimes. In my communication, I underscored the gravity of the situation, highlighting the blatant disregard for the rule of law by high-ranking magistrates who had taken liberties to create their own laws. I referenced insights from French law Professor Yves Strickler, emphasizing the recurring pattern of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision). Expressing skepticism about the integrity of Paris Public Prosecutor Rémy Heitz, whom I had previously informed about these irregularities, I raised concerns about his potential inaction.

(127) Within an astonishingly short span of less than 55 minutes after sending this email, I received a summons from the French Police. This rapid response was significant for several reasons:

(128) A) [SELF-CENSORED: In compliance with potential obligations under the [REDACTED] and other applicable legal frameworks, I am compelled to omit a pivotal detail that significantly pertains to this request for interim measures. This decision is made out of caution to avoid any unintentional violations of legal statutes, particularly those concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]

(129) B) The timing raised suspicion. Initially, I thought Villani might have reported me to the police, but his Director of Communication, Philippe Mouricou, assured me they were not involved. If true, this implies I was under illegal surveillance, a serious allegation.

(130) C) This action clearly obstructed my right to individual petition, instilling a chilling effect on my efforts to seek justice.

(131) In the detailed email sent to Mr. Villani, Philippe Mouricou, and Valentine Roux, I laid out multiple instances of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision) with concrete examples. I highlighted the dangerous precedent set by magistrates inventing laws, thus usurping the powers of the French Parliament. I reminded him of the legal obligation under Article 434-1 of the French Criminal Code to report serious crimes, reinforced by the information from the French anticorruption association Anticor. My goal was to formally alert the ECtHR about France’s serious violations, as the French judicial system had proven itself fundamentally flawed and untrustworthy.

(132) Less than an hour later, at 21:58 China Standard Time, I received a summons from the French Police as a “mis en cause” (suspect), a baseless and nonsensical accusation. The statistical improbability of the police accurately guessing my email addresses and the timing of their summons, immediately following my email to Villani, suggests surveillance rather than coincidence. Mouricou’s subsequent email on January 22 confirmed their non-involvement in this police action.

(133) In September 2021, a new revelation came to light. Allegedly, I had conducted a cyber-attack against the French Police by overwhelming a police officer’s mailbox, a claim I vehemently deny. This accusation might be rooted in a technical error if my emails were being illicitly monitored and auto-forwarded to the officer, inadvertently creating an email loop. While this is mere speculation, I assert my innocence in any alleged cyber-attack, emphasizing the illegality of any surveillance against me by French authorities.

(134) Throughout these incidents, I have strived to bring to light one of the most significant fraud cases in history, conducting myself with integrity and adherence to legal and ethical standards. The disproportionate and questionable response from the French authorities only deepens my resolve to seek justice and transparency.

(135) It’s crucial to highlight the violation of China’s sovereignty in this matter. The French Police’s direct summons to me, a lawful permanent resident of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), contravened international protocols. Proper procedure dictates that any such summons should have been coordinated through the Ministry of Justice of China, respecting the sovereignty and legal processes of my country of residence.

(136) My decision not to comply with the police summons was influenced by several compelling factors:

(137) A. Perceived Threat: The most significant reason was a palpable sense of threat. Although I was not yet aware of the criminal complaint lodged against me by alleged criminal Nicole Belloubet, the manner of the summons and my understanding of legal protocols concerning hindrance led me to feel intimidated. This was communicated to the French Police, emphasizing the inappropriateness of their approach.

(138) B. Financial Constraints: At that time, the financial burden of traveling to France at short notice was prohibitive. Airfare prices for such last-minute travel are exorbitantly high, posing an insurmountable financial challenge for me.

(139) C. Health and Safety Concerns: The emergence of COVID-19 in China added a significant layer of complexity to the situation. The French Embassy’s advisories against visiting public places, including train stations and transportation hubs, underscored the health risks involved. Adhering to these warnings and prioritizing health and safety, it was prudent to avoid international travel, particularly in a region increasingly affected by the pandemic.

(140) In summary, my decision to ignore the summons was a measured response, considering the irregularities in the summoning process, my personal safety, financial limitations, and the unfolding public health crisis. My actions were in no way a disregard for legal obligations but a cautious approach in an unprecedented and sensitive situation.

(141) Furthermore and if I may add, at the time of these events, my confidence in the integrity and authority of the French judicial system was profoundly shaken. The recurring instances of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” – the doctoring, forging, falsifying, or altering of legal, public, official, or court documents – point to a deeply troubling pattern. This practice, unofficially but seemingly condoned by the highest levels of politicians and magistrates, starkly illustrates a systemic failure within the judicial process.

(142) Given these circumstances, my belief is that while the French justice system may function effectively for some cases and individuals, it has failed me profoundly. The numerous and repeated breaches of legal ethics and procedure that I have encountered are not isolated incidents but indicators of systemic issues that undermine the very foundation of justice.

(143) Until these critical problems are resolved, I maintain that the French justice system, in its current state, holds no legitimate authority over me. This loss of trust is not merely a personal stance but a reflection of the severe deficiencies within the system. The importance of this matter cannot be overstated, especially in the context of the European Court of Human Rights. It is crucial that the Court recognizes the gravity of the situation and the ongoing challenges within France’s judicial framework.

(144) The French judicial system, as I have experienced and observed, is not just flawed – it is fundamentally broken, at least for those not rich enough to afford legal representation. The ongoing violations and miscarriages of justice I have endured are testament to a system in dire need of reform and accountability. It is my earnest hope that bringing these issues to light will contribute to a much-needed overhaul of the system, restoring its integrity and its mandate to deliver fair and impartial justice.

(145) Given my experiences and the prevailing circumstances, how could I possibly trust in the fairness and effectiveness of legal representation provided through France’s legal aid system? This question isn’t merely rhetorical; it’s rooted in a deeply ingrained conviction, one that I hold beyond a reasonable doubt, about the total ineffectiveness of legal aid representation in my case.

(146) My skepticism extends beyond the issue of representation. The recurrent instances of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” – the deliberate manipulation and falsification of official documents – have irreparably eroded my trust in the entire judicial system. In such a climate, where the sanctity of legal documents is routinely compromised, any interaction with the system feels akin to walking into a trap. Under these conditions, can one reasonably expect fairness and justice?

(147) This distrust is further compounded by a specific incident while I was still living in France: my illegal arrest and unacknowledged detention at the Rosny-sous-Bois police station. Not only was this detention unwarranted and unlawful, but to my knowledge, it was also conveniently unrecorded. This incident, which I suspect was followed by yet another case of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision), is not an isolated one. It is, tragically, one of many instances that paint a picture of a system that has veered dangerously close to authoritarianism.

(148) IMPORTANT NOTE: about the unacknowledged detention: While I have chosen to set aside two of the five cases I initially submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2018, it’s crucial to mention a specific incident related to one of these cases. This incident involves my unacknowledged detention at the Rosny-sous-Bois police station in France, an experience that is alarmingly indicative of the systemic issues I’ve faced.

(149) To contextualize the severity of unacknowledged detention, I refer to Philip Leach’s “Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights,” fourth edition. In paragraph 6.226, Leach highlights that “Unacknowledged detention by the state has been found to be a ‘complete negation’ of the Article 5 guarantees and accordingly a ‘most grave violation’. […].” This statement from a respected legal scholar underscores the seriousness of my experience and the broader implications for human rights in France.

(150) The incident at Rosny-sous-Bois isn’t just an isolated anomaly; it’s part of a disturbing pattern that paints a troubling picture of France as a semi-authoritarian regime. This perception is not baseless but is underpinned by concrete experiences and a pattern of the serious crime of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision) that I have personally encountered.

(151) When considering the gravity of my accusations against McDonald’s – a corporation that I assert is operating as one of the world’s most influential white-collar crime syndicates – the connections between McDonald’s and the French Police, and the involvement of high-level magistrates and politicians, my caution is not only justified but necessary. The mathematical demonstrability of many of the frauds, combined with the questionable integrity of the French judicial process, necessitates a heightened level of vigilance and skepticism.

(152) In light of these factors, my hesitance to place trust in the French legal system, particularly in relation to this case, is both rational and warranted. The unacknowledged detention episode, despite being unrelated to the McDonald’s case, is nevertheless a stark reminder of the potential risks and challenges faced by individuals who dare to confront powerful entities within a system that appears to be compromised at various levels.

(153) Let’s continue.

(154) [SELF-CENSORED: In compliance with potential obligations under the [REDACTED] and other applicable legal frameworks, I am compelled to omit a pivotal detail that significantly pertains to this request for interim measures. This decision is made out of caution to avoid any unintentional violations of legal statutes, particularly those concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]

(155) In September 2021, I shockingly discovered that I had been, or possibly still am, a person of interest to the French authorities. This revelation came when my parents informed me that the French Police had summoned and interrogated my brother around early November 2019, coinciding with the dismissal of McDonald’s Corporation’s former CEO. I immediately sought to contact the involved French Police officer for more information. To my astonishment, I learned that a criminal complaint filed against me had been lodged by the former Minister of Justice and alleged criminal, Nicole Belloubet. This complaint was purportedly for identity theft, linked to my creation of a non-official website aimed at exposing the serious crimes of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision) in the McDonald’s case, among other cases.

(156) Further, it appeared that my efforts to warn elected official Cédric Villani about the McDonald’s frauds might have also prompted legal action against me. During the phone conversation, in September 2021, with Judicial Police Officer Annie Dénommé, based on her recollection, Cédric Villani had also lodged a criminal complaint against me. Officer Dénommé, whom I now regard as allegedly complicit in criminal activity, dismissed my claims about the pattern of serious crimes of “faux en écritures” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision) despite lacking evidence to counter my assertions. She clearly threatened to lodge a criminal complain against me if I were to send her informative emails, accusing me of overwhelming another officer’s email inbox.

(157) This situation is far from trivial. Given the complexity and opacity of the events, I am compelled to speculate on the sequence of occurrences. The January 2020 police summons I received was not only threatening but also unlawful, considering my then imminent petition to the European Court of Human Rights highlighting the recurring pattern of serious crimes of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision) within the French judicial system.

(158) In January 2020, my communication with the French Police Officer Valérie Bussone was limited to a total of five emails. Four of these were directly addressed to Officer Bussone, to forward the emails I had sent to Cédric Villani. These emails detailed the pressures and threats I received from his Director of Communication, Philippe Mouricou. The fifth email included Officer Bussone in the CC field. It is implausible that such a limited number of emails could be considered as overwhelming and as a result blocking her mailbox.

(159) I must clarify, as previously mentioned in this timeline, that I strongly suspect, beyond a reasonable doubt I believe, that my email communications were under illegal surveillance. The purported email overload incident could be indicative of this. My theory is that, if indeed my emails were being monitored, my communications to Mr. Villani might have been automatically and covertly forwarded to Officer Bussone. If both Nicole Belloubet and Cédric Villani had indeed filed criminal complaints against me, as was stated by Officer Annie Dénommé, it’s conceivable that the police would monitor my communications diligently, particularly given Nicole Belloubet’s prominent role as the Minister of Justice.

(160) The only explanation I can conceive for the alleged email overload with just five emails involves a technical error possibly due to surveillance software. It could be a scenario where a recursive loop was created:

(161) - I send an email to Villani, which is covertly copied and CCed to Officer Bussone due to surveillance.

(162) - If I send an email to Villani and openly CC it to Officer Bussone, the surveillance system might mistakenly copy and CC this email to Bussone again.

(163) - This process could unintentionally create a recursive, infinite loop, rapidly resending the same email multiple times in a brief period and potentially overwhelming Bussone’s inbox.

(164) This theory, while speculative, is currently the most plausible explanation I can offer for the alleged incident involving only five emails causing such an issue. It suggests a possible malfunction in the surveillance system rather than intentional email flooding on my part.

(165) While the accusation of email overload is factual, and my theory of a surveillance-induced recursive loop is speculative, it’s crucial to highlight the improbability that the French Police, in January 2020, could accurately identify the specific email addresses I used to contact Mr. Villani. This detail is particularly pertinent when considering the nature of my emails to Villani, which focused on McDonald’s Corporation’s fraudulent activities and the pattern of serious crimes of ‘faux en écriture publique’ (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision) within the French judiciary.

(166) I had explicitly alerted French Police Officer Annie Dénommé about the instances of serious crimes of “faux en écriture publique” (the falsification/forging/doctoring/altering of a legal/public/official/court document/decision). Her response, or lack thereof, potentially constitutes a failure to report a serious crime and an attempt at witness tampering, further exacerbating the psychological toll on me.

(167) Given the context of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, also known as the Palermo Convention), this leads me to a critical query for the Court: Why hasn’t France sought legal cooperation with the People’s Republic of China in this matter? Given that the summons was related to the McDonald’s case, and considering that related frauds occurred in China, transparent cooperation between the two nations seems logical. The lack of such cooperation raises the question of whether there is an attempt by France to obscure certain facts or protect certain interests.

(168) In 2020, I reached out to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) once again. My initial warnings to the FBI, dating back to as early as 2015, had highlighted potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and that frauds were committed and the FBI should have understood the money laundering implication. However, it seemed that the full implications of these serious matters were not fully understood by them at that time. Recognizing the urgency and gravity of the situation, I decided to contact the FBI Field Offices at the U.S. Embassies in both France and China. Given my current location in China, the FBI Field Office at the U.S. Embassy in China was the most appropriate and relevant point of contact for these communications.

(169) In my detailed discussions with Mahonri Manjarrez, an FBI language specialist based at the U.S. Embassy in France, and Adam Rogalski, an Assistant Legal Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in China, I meticulously outlined the fraudulent activities perpetrated by McDonald’s Corporation.

(170) On March 11, 2022, I presented the FBI with three explicit and well-documented instances of mass-marketing fraud committed by McDonald’s. The critical nature of these examples was such that, if thoroughly investigated, they could have significant implications for the corporate entity. However, the extent to which the FBI has pursued these leads remains unknown to me. If a proper investigation into these matters had been conducted, I am convinced that McDonald’s Corporation would be facing serious legal repercussions by now. The inaction or the extent of the FBI’s actions in this regard raises serious concerns about the enforcement of laws designed to prevent such corporate malfeasance.

(171) On March 11, 2022, I also made a crucial request to the FBI: to verify the authenticity of my claims with the Chinese authorities. This was a sensitive but necessary step, considering my residency in China and the delicate nature of liaising with foreign law enforcement agencies. In light of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention, it seemed logical that the American authorities would seek to collaborate with their Chinese counterparts on this matter. The same rationale should apply to the French authorities; international cooperation is vital in cases of transnational organized crime.

(172) The timeline of events becomes particularly significant in the period between September 2021 and July 2022. During this interval, I received indications that the French government had acknowledged a serious mistake in their handling of my case and intended to propose a non-disclosure agreement to me. I detailed this development in an email sent to Assistant Legal Attaché Adam Rogalski and a China-based American-trained lawyer on February 3, 2023, at 17:34 China Standard Time. This email meticulously described the circumstances and conversations that led me to understand France’s error and their subsequent plans. The implication of such an agreement, especially in a case of this magnitude involving potential government missteps and corporate malfeasance, raised numerous questions about the motivations and intentions behind this alleged potential offer from the French authorities.

(173) Here is part of the content of the email sent on February 3, 2023, at 17:34 China Standard Time:

“[NOTE FOR THE ECTHR. THE BEGINNING OF THE EMAIL IS SELF-CENSORED: In compliance with potential obligations under the [REDACTED] and other applicable legal frameworks, I am compelled to omit a pivotal detail that significantly pertains to this request for interim measures. This decision is made out of caution to avoid any unintentional violations of legal statutes, particularly those concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]

It’s him:


[REDACTED] [NOTE FOR THE ECTHR. SELF-CENSORED: Due to uncertainties regarding specific articles of French law that may apply in this context, I have decided to exercise caution by refraining from revealing the name of an individual pivotal to this request for interim measures. My decision is grounded in a prudent approach to avoid any potential legal transgressions under French legislation, especially those related to [REDACTED] laws.]

[NAME OF THE PERSON: REDACTED]. I attach a picture of him to this email (the one from this website).

[NOTE FOR THE ECTHR. SELF-CENSORED: Due to uncertainties regarding specific articles of French law that may apply in this context, I have decided to exercise caution by refraining from revealing the name of an individual pivotal to this request for interim measures. My decision is grounded in a prudent approach to avoid any potential legal transgressions under French legislation, especially those related to [REDACTED] laws.]

I have to check the date but it was before I contact you, before July 2022 for sure… anyway, once, he told me about this McDonald’s case that they (the French government) clearly messed up, and that they were going to ask me to sign some papers and that it was going to stay between us and he made a gesture with his hand pointing at a table we, some expats here, including a couple of French people, used to seat. I had talked about this story before to them.

Does he know something I don’t know? Did he expect me to answer something? What makes him think that France would want me to sign what I interpret to be a NDA? I don’t know.

You see, to say that the French government messed up, yes, definitely if Ms. Belloubet lodged a criminal complaint against me and later they realized I was actually right, they definitely messed up. Because if it’s not this, it means France is covering up a major case of fraud and money laundering while they should actually alert their European counterparts since the fraud happened in other countries. This part of what this Frenchman said doesn’t shock me.

The part about they will ask me to sign a non-disclosure agreement, it doesn’t shock me in the sense that it can be his imagination or educated guess. No problem.

But the part that it was going to stay between us, clearly implied that I shouldn’t talk to anybody else, this is not normal. I am sorry but it’s not normal.

Also, I remember now, another thing he mentioned was the reason, that the French government can’t let McDonald’s go bankrupt because it would affect too many people.

So, of course, as you can guess, it’s potentially a sensitive topic since this guy is supposed to be a [REDACTED]. How would he know this? Why would he tell me this?

Also, I submitted my SEC complaint on “Submission Number 16685-469-065-055 was submitted on Tuesday, November 15, 2022 at 12:51:36 PM EST” see screenshot attached to this email (“Screenshot 2023-02-03 at 16.36.06.png”) and next day on November 16, 2022, this Frenchman makes contact with me trying to mention the McDonald’s story (see attached file IMG_6739.jpg) even though we hadn’t talked for a long time. Maybe a coincidence, but what he had said that night we met in person, it’s just too weird, too unusual… why would he tell me that it would have to stay between us?

Mr. Rogalski, what’s going on exactly? Do you know anything? I am under the impression that I am not being told everything about this case.

[NOTE FOR THE ECTHR. THE REST OF THE EMAIL IS SELF-CENSORED: In compliance with potential obligations under the [REDACTED] and other applicable legal frameworks, I am compelled to omit a pivotal detail that significantly pertains to this request for interim measures. This decision is made out of caution to avoid any unintentional violations of legal statutes, particularly those concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]” [END OF THE EMAIL I SENT TO Assistant Legal Attaché Adam Rogalski working for the U.S. Embassy in Beijing]

(174) I remain uncertain about the true affiliation of the individual I met, whether he is connected to French [REDACTED] or if he was conveying a message on behalf of an embassy or consulate. Notably, he didn’t just allude to the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) once, but twice. Upon reflection, I recall his first mention was less explicit than his subsequent reference. Intriguingly, during our initial interaction, he expressed a personal hope that I would persist in my endeavors and not yield to any settlement offers.

(175) Moreover, this individual once remarked on aspects of my personal history in France, details I’m certain I had never shared with him, especially those predating the year 2000. Such knowledge hints at a deeper awareness of my background, fueling my suspicion of his potential connections.

(176) As someone who values definitive proof, akin to a rigorous mathematical proof, I cannot conclusively assert whom this individual represents. However, the peculiarities of our interactions, coupled with later revelations that I am compelled to withhold due to compliance with the [REDACTED] and other relevant legal frameworks, suggest that what he told me was more than mere coincidence.

(177) The interactions with this individual, particularly the explicit nature of his communication during our second conversation, leave no room for doubt: his messages were not coincidental. He made it clear that the prospect of obtaining justice was directly tied to my willingness to sign a non-disclosure agreement. This is not a mere insinuation but an overt suggestion of conditional justice, contingent upon my agreement to remain silent. This proposition amounts to unmistakable blackmail, presenting a stark choice between silence and the pursuit of justice.

(178) In August 2022, I was subjected to what I consider a serious form of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR, inflicted by the Chinese Police. This incident, while not the most extreme form of torture, significantly infringed upon my human rights.

(179) This occurrence was set against the backdrop of escalating [REDACTED], a trend that my wife and I had increasingly felt since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Even before the pandemic, there were already indications of rising nationalism in China, occasionally leading to distressing interactions with some locals. The broader implications of this trend are complex and extend beyond the immediate focus of this request.

(180) The specific incident that led to my mistreatment involved a peaceful protest against racial discrimination. After being wrongfully denied entry to a park due to my skin color, I chose to sit at the entrance in a symbolic act of protest. During this peaceful demonstration, I was physically assaulted by some individuals, and parts of the incident were captured and shared online, eventually going viral on Weibo with over 130 million views.

(181) Two days after this publicized incident, I was subjected to what I describe as torture by the Chinese Police, in an attempt to extract a false confession from me. This experience was deeply traumatic, though their efforts to coerce a confession were unsuccessful.

(182) Following this ordeal, I sought assistance from the French Embassy, but they declined to intervene, citing the principle of adherence to Chinese laws within China’s jurisdiction. While I understand the principle of territorial jurisdiction, this stance appeared particularly contradictory in light of France’s previous actions that breached China’s sovereignty, such as the direct summoning of a lawful foreign resident by French police forces within Chinese territory.

(183) Furthermore, French law has extraterritorial provisions regarding torture and ill-treatment, implying that the French state had a legal obligation to assist me in this situation. The embassy’s refusal, therefore, not only contradicts their earlier disregard for Chinese sovereignty but also ignores France’s own legal responsibilities in cases of torture involving its citizens abroad.

(184) Additionally, the response from the embassy was legally insufficient as the embassy staff member I communicated with failed to identify themselves, as required by French law. An offhand comment made during our conversation also raised concerns that my communications might still have been under unauthorized surveillance as late as August/September 2022.

(185) In September 2022, after much consideration, I decided to contact a lawyer recommended by a friend. This decision marked a significant turning point in my efforts to address the case against McDonald’s Corporation. Through diligent work and ongoing refinement of the case details, I have come to understand that the situation constitutes a criminal RICO case, highlighting a continuing pattern of racketeering activity by McDonald’s Corporation.

(186) On November 8, 2022, in U.S. time (November 9, 2022, in China time), I exercised my rights under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and submitted a request to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This FOIA request was part of my strategic plan to compile additional information for a forthcoming, more detailed complaint to the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower concerning the extensive and ongoing misconduct within McDonald’s Corporation.

(187) The SEC’s prompt response to my request was both surprising and commendable. Immediately upon submission, I received an acknowledgment (Request No. 23-00270-FOIA), showcasing the efficiency of the U.S. administration in handling such matters. Shortly thereafter, I was informed that my FOIA request had been reclassified as a Privacy Act request (Request No. 23-00030-FOPA), due to the nature of the information sought, which pertained to my own records. This reclassification under the Privacy Act underscores the procedural nuances of dealing with personal information in legal contexts.

(188) In pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of my earlier efforts, I found it necessary to acquire complete records of my submissions to the SEC from 2015. My aim was to retrieve any missing or previously overlooked information from the documents I had provided to the SEC during that year.

(189) When no response was forthcoming from the SEC regarding my request, I proceeded to file a new complaint with the Office of the Whistleblower on November 15, 2022. This latest submission was significantly more expansive, incorporating the names of 20 additional persons who I believe are of crucial relevance to the investigation. This list includes high-ranking legal officials such as Jean-Michel Hayat, Chantal Arens, François Molins, and former Minister of Justice Nicole Belloubet, as well as French President Emmanuel Macron. Additionally, I identified law firms Péchenard & Associés and the prominent Big Law firm Allen & Overy. These firms, I allege, have played a role in assisting McDonald’s Corporation in committing serious financial crimes, including but not limited to money laundering. My goal in naming these entities and individuals is to ensure a thorough and all-encompassing investigation into the malpractices surrounding McDonald’s Corporation.

(190) On November 15, 2022, at 12:51:36 PM EST, corresponding to November 16, 2022, at 1:47:36 AM China Standard Time, I submitted my second whistleblower complaint to the SEC, under Submission Number 16685-469-065-055. Strikingly, less than 24 hours later, the French individual I previously mentioned contacted me, unexpectedly bringing up McDonald’s.

(191) Throughout 2022 and into 2023, I dedicated myself to analyzing U.S. laws and trying to understand statistical analysis, writing approximately 100 emails to Assistant Legal Attaché Adam Rogalski. Regrettably, my efforts appeared one-sided as I received no responses. This silence may be due to geographical constraints since I’m in China, but I wondered why there was no attempt at collaborative investigation involving Chinese authorities, which could accelerate the case’s progress.

(192) From September 2022 until around April-May 2023, I invested an extraordinary amount of time and effort into this case, driven by a resolve to confront one of the world’s most formidable crime syndicates. However, my momentum was temporarily halted in May 2023 due to a bout with Covid-19, from which it took me a month to recover. By mid-June 2023, I was ready to resume my quest for justice. At this juncture, I received crucial information, which, due to the constraints imposed by the [REDACTED] and related legal considerations, I must, regrettably, withhold from this request for interim measures. This undisclosed information is highly relevant to the ongoing legal situation and my pursuit of justice.

(193) IMPORTANT NOTE FOR THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, note written on December 15, 2023: I started drafting this request for interim measures over a month ago. I haven’t done much work on it for the last 2-3 weeks. Today, December 15, 2023, I tried to quickly read to make it’s relatively accurate. I don’t have the time to finish writing it. What I said about the [REDACTED] and related legal considerations is very real. I am going to explain separately. What is written below regarding the wrongful termination case was also written over 2-3 weeks ago.

(194) A brief timeline of case REF-GFP-001 (my 2018 reference number), (ECtHR’s possible reference number: 29837/18)

(195) In 2018, I submitted five distinct cases to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), all of which were unfortunately rejected. The first case concerned my wrongful employment termination, while the second revolved around what I now recognize as a criminal RICO case targeting McDonald’s Corporation and their accomplices. The third and fourth cases also involved human rights violations; however, for the sake of brevity in this current request, I will not delve into them at this moment. The fifth case pertained directly to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR by France, specifically citing psychological torture.

(196) At that time, I contemplated submitting a sixth case, envisioned as a comprehensive aggregation of cases one to four, to highlight the recurring pattern of falsification, doctoring, altering, and forging of public, legal, official, and court documents—activities constituting the serious crimes of ‘faux en écriture publique’. Regrettably, due to the immense mental strain I was under, I was unable to pursue this sixth case. In this current request for interim measures, I primarily focus on these grave crimes of ‘faux en écriture publique’, condoned by top-level French officials and magistrates, while omitting the third and fourth cases I had submitted in 2018.

(197) I will now briefly outline several key dates and incidents to demonstrate the total failures of the French system. These failures, I believe, not only led to a violation of the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China in one instance but may also currently expose me to blackmail in relation to the criminal RICO case involving McDonald’s Corporation.

(198) In the subsequent section, I will shift the focus to the inherent risks to my own safety and that of my family. I will also discuss other probable imminent risks that may arise should the Court fail to intervene in this matter.

(199) At the end of 2010, I faced wrongful termination from my job due to participating in a strike. This strike was a response to my employer’s unilateral decision to modify my work contract, which I had refused. Despite my objections, they proceeded with the change, and my final salary was even below the legal minimum wage in France. In protest, I initiated a strike to demand full payment of my salary, only to be wrongfully terminated. Specifically, I was recorded as having resigned, a claim entirely false as I had not resigned.

(200) Seeking legal aid for civil litigation, I encountered my first hurdle when it was denied because legal aid lawyers were striking at the time. Lacking in-depth legal knowledge, I lost the expedited proceedings that followed. Subsequently, I was granted legal aid, but over the next couple of years, four different lawyers were assigned to my case, with no significant progress or judgment issued. According to French law, I should have been immediately reinstated, a fact I was unaware of at the time of my illegal termination.

(201) I suspect the last two lawyers assigned to my case may have been dishonest in their handling of it. Considering the speech by the former President of the European Court of Human Rights in France to the “promotion 2016 de l’École de formation du Barreau de Paris (EFB)”, it raises the question: if legal aid lawyers, as a form of public service, falsify any document, does it constitute “faux en écriture publique”? While I am uncertain, I believe it might.

(202) Despite my efforts to follow due procedure, including alerting the Procureur Général of the Appeal Court about the ineffectiveness of the legal aid, the lack of action on their part leads me to believe that any resulting investigation report is likely to contain false information, thus constituting “faux en écriture publique.” Otherwise, it would imply an admission of fault by France in handling my complaint.

(203) In 2016, I attempted to sue France for an ongoing violation of Article 6 of the ECHR, given that five years had passed without a resolution, clearly breaching the right to have one’s case heard “within a reasonable time.” I applied for legal aid for an expedited procedure to sue France under Article L141-1 of the “code de l’organisation judiciaire”.

(204) However, my request was rejected by the Legal Aid Office of the Paris Court, which blatantly disregarded the French laws related to “demande d’aide provisoire à l’aide juridictionnelle” (provisional request for legal aid). This act itself constitutes the crime defined under Article 432-1 of the French Criminal Code, which states: “The act, by a person holding public authority, acting in the exercise of their functions, of taking measures intended to thwart the execution of the law is punishable by five years imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 euros.”

(205) My appeals to Jean-Michel Hayat, the then President of the Paris Court, and subsequently to Chantal Arens, the then first President of the Appeal Court (who would later become Chief Justice of one the French Supreme Courts (Cour de Cassation)), were met with what I suspect to be “faux en écriture publique.

(206) My rights, guaranteed by Article 13 of the ECHR and transposed under French law in Article L141-1 of the code de l’organisation judiciaire, were blatantly denied. I was under no legal obligation to follow the procedure under Article L141-1 considering my knowledge of the factual ineffectiveness of legal aid lawyers. Even if I had been granted legal aid for this procedure, I am certain it would have led nowhere. Yet, I wish to emphasize to the ECtHR that, despite ongoing duress and psychological torture by France, I endeavored to follow the procedure to the best of my ability.

(207) Excluding at least two potential counts of “faux en écriture publique” by legal aid lawyers, I currently possess physical evidence to prove 3 to 5 counts, if not more, of “faux en écriture publique” in this wrongful termination case. I am confident about 3 counts, highly likely about 5, and there are probably many more that I cannot confirm, as they would be the results of internal investigations presumably conducted by the French Ministry of Justice.

(208) Continuous Violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

(209) The treatment I have endured at the hands of the French authorities constitutes psychological torture and represents a continuous violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, I urgently request that the European Court of Human Rights direct France to immediately cease its current and ongoing practices, which I will detail later in this submission.

(210) This persistent violation of Article 3 alone warrants the approval of my request. However, I will also elaborate on additional, recent developments that have not only intensified my suffering but also pose significant and real threats to my physical safety, as well as to the safety of my in-laws residing in China. Moreover, I will discuss the blackmail that I face and that I am most likely still currently facing.

(211) Before I proceed, I would like to share a personal experience that underscores the severity of my situation: In 2017, driven by the relentless psychological distress inflicted upon me by the French state, I sought the assistance of a psychiatrist in China. This medical doctor, whom I believed to be highly qualified, recognized and affirmed on two separate occasions that what I was experiencing was indeed psychological torture.

(212) In our initial sessions, the psychiatrist acknowledged the psychological torture I was experiencing. At that time, we had not had many meetings, and I sensed that her assessment, though insightful, might have been preliminary. As our sessions progressed, and I delved deeper into the details of how the ongoing legal entanglements were pushing me towards the brink of insanity, I felt the need to seek her opinion once more.

(213) She shared with me her own experiences with legal procedures in China and expressed empathy, understanding the inherent difficulties. When I posed the question again, now with her having a more comprehensive understanding of my circumstances, she reaffirmed her initial diagnosis. She was unequivocal in her assessment – what I was enduring was indeed psychological torture. She observed that my life had been ruined. This confirmation came in 2017, after several in-depth consultations, lending significant weight to her professional opinion.

(214) In this submission for an interim measure, made under oath and subject to penalty of perjury, I could elaborate on the subsequent events that unfolded. However, for the present moment, I wish to respectfully address the Court:

(215) As a preliminary point, I would like to emphasize that the psychiatrist who assessed my condition is a qualified medical doctor specializing in psychiatry. While I hold the Court in the highest esteem, it is pertinent to note that the honorable judges, though highly knowledgeable in legal matters, do not have the same medical expertise.

(216) This distinction is crucial when considering the nature of my suffering. While it might be challenging to perceive how a persistent denial of justice could culminate in psychological torture, I would like to present a few key points in my timeline. These points will illustrate how the ongoing acts of sabotage within the French judicial system continue to inflict an immense state of suffering upon me, a suffering recognized and diagnosed by a medical professional.

(217) It is my intention to provide the Court with a clear understanding of the depth and severity of the psychological impact these events have had, and continue to have, on my well-being.

(218) Furthermore, I wish to underscore that the repercussions of these actions extend beyond myself. My wife, too, has endured severe physical and mental health consequences as a direct result of the crimes perpetrated by French state employees and, as I allege, condoned by some high-ranking French officials. However, out of respect for her privacy and due to concerns for our safety, I must exercise caution in how much detail I disclose regarding her situation. It is vital to recognize that the harm inflicted by these actions is not isolated to me alone but also profoundly affects those closest to me, adding another layer of suffering and injustice to this already complex situation.

(219) Does France keep violating China’s sovereignty and spying on Chinese residents within China and Chinese citizens within China? And how France has already clearly endangered me and my family.

(220) Text

(221) Text


PLEASE NOTE: if you read carefully the beginning of this submission, it’s written “DRAFT NUMBER 6” because I was running out of time and couldn’t finish explaining to the ECtHR certain aspects of the case. That’s why paragraphs (220) and (221) are empty.

To gain a clearer understanding of the sequence of events in this case, I invite you to view a detailed timeline at the following link:
This timeline provides a comprehensive overview of the key milestones and developments.


Vincent B. Le Corre

I am the key witness and whistleblower in the major criminal RICO case targeting McDonald’s Corporation and their accomplices for fraud, money laundering, and corruption of foreign officials and magistrates. Initially granted anonymity by the European Court of Human Rights (Rules 33 and 47 of the Rules of Court), I made the decision in August 2023 to temporarily go public with my identity. This decision, driven by concerns for my own safety and that of my loved ones, was taken despite the potential risks, hoping it will be temporary only and that I can return to anonymity soon.